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Essay
The Other Trade War
Kathleen Claussent
INTRODUCTION
The trade war is on: beginning in the first half of 2018, the
United States has employed half-century-old domestic law to im-
pose tariffs on select products affecting U.S. industries, and
other countries have struck back with tariffs of their own on U.S.
products coming from battleground U.S. states.2 It is an atypical
war: in this war, the United States has implemented tariff rate
increases also on its allies.3 Some say these reciprocal moves sug-
gest a turn away from the international trade law regime. For
international trade policymakers and lawyers, however, the tar-
iff war is only part of the story. Meanwhile, another trade war
has been playing out in Geneva on the floor of the Dispute Set-
tlement Body ("DSB") at the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
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Schoenbaum, Richard Steinberg, Terry Stewart, and Mark Wu, as well as col-
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1. While the terminology is unnecessarily inflammatory, references to a
trade "war" proliferate. Governments, media, and academic commentators have
employed war terminology for example by referring to the United States as car-
rying out a World Trade Organization (WTO) "blockade," taking "an ax" to the
WTO, using an "arsenal of weapons" against the WTO Appellate Body, and by
contrasting the present moment with trade "peace." I use the war rhetoric here
only to situate the underlying disagreements.
2. Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: The International Front, LAW-
FARE (July 27, 2018, 11:16AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/surveying-trade
-war-battlefield-international-front.
3. Id. (describing the scope of the duties imposed).
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This other trade war holds great consequence both for the global
economy and for the development of international trade law.
The other trade war takes as its target the expansion of ju-
dicial lawmaking by the WTO Appellate Body ("AB"). Once
termed the "crown jewel" of the WTO,4 the dispute settlement
mechanism seems to have lost its shine, at least to some. Once
more, governments are resorting to their own trade weapons, ra-
ther than relying on the multilateral, institutional approach that
has guided the last quarter century. In contrast with the tariff
tit-for-tat, the other trade war has the potential to have vast im-
plications for canons of legal interpretation in and the composi-
tion of international institutions.5 This war is comprised of bat-
tles regarding the contours of the international trade regime and
the governance methods to which its participants agreed. This
war faces a tension at its core about the appropriate scope of del-
egation to international institutions and international dispute
settlement design.
What gives rise to this increasing discontent with the cur-
rent system? The confrontations may seem stronger, but the
problems with the system are not new. Nor is this other trade
war just the manifestation of a new disdain by the United States
for international institutions. Rather, this other trade war began
long before recent events. It is the product of an evolution in con-
cerns propounded most frequently by the United States, but
shared in part by at least a dozen other governments for over 15
years.
A substantial amount of ink has been spilled on both sides
of this debate in recent months, and with increased fervor. This
Essay does not purport to provide an additional proposal for re-
form for policymakers. Rather, it amends the diagnosis and ar-
gue that the forest-the broader repercussions for legal design-
is more important than the trees-the immediate trade issues. I
contest the view that the United States is creating deadlock at
the NATO in an unprincipled sovereigntist move, seeking to flex
its muscles on the international stage and dismiss international
institutions outright. To the contrary, the longstanding concerns
about the NATO AB's judicialization are legal and teleological.
4. Manfred Elsig et al., Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth




5. The choice to impose tariffs is certainly related to the crises underlying
the other trade war; the two are not entirely distinct. See supra Part II.
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They are shared in varying respects by several WTO Members.
More important still is an acknowledgement of the spectrum of
international law ideologies informing the Members' views that,
during this period of reconsideration, could have an impact on
further dispute settlement design.
In Part I of this Essay, I outline the positions of critics of the
WTO dispute settlement system and situate those views in the
context of a broader conversation on issues with international
trade law. Part II argues for rethinking and disaggregating.
While some commentators view the other trade war monopti-
cally as a general crisis precipitated by power politics, I intro-
duce four different crises or conflicts that I believe frame the de-
bate. This Essay's approach challenges the popular perspective
on how the present critical juncture developed and offers a more
pragmatic acknowledgment of divisions in legal ideology. Part
III situates my proposed frame in the larger context of interna-
tional dispute settlement design and delegation. The Essay con-
cludes that the international dispute settlement "forest" should
be the focus of our sustained work, rather than the trade law
"trees".
I. THE TRADE LAW SYSTEM & ITS CHALLENGES
The creation of the WTO in 1995 heralded a needed new
chapter in the international economic law dispute settlement
system. The system that predated the WTO under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was widely considered
to suffer from certain weaknesses.6 One change undertaken to
address some of the weaknesses with the GATT system was the
creation of an appellate review mechanism to correct serious le-
gal errors or fundamental flaws in panel reports.7 The European
Union ("EU") and the United States were the primary advocates
of such a mechanism, although neither intended to create "a
6. See What's Needed for the GATT After the Uruguay Round?, 86 Am.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 69, 69-71 (1992).
7. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, 1986-1992,
2767-68 (Terrance P. Stewart ed. 1993).
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strong international court."8 Rather, the AB was "an inspired af-
terthought" in the negotiations.9
The AB is a standing body of seven persons, three of whom
serve on any one case.10 Those seven persons are appointed by
consensus of all WATO Members; thus, a single Member can block
an appointment of one of the adjudicators by refusing to join the
consensus.1 1 AB members serve four-year terms with the possi-
bility of being re-appointed once, again by consensus. 12
Over its short existence, many WATO Members and commen-
tators have expressed strong support for the AB's work, recog-
nizing its substantial contributions to the legitimacy of the NWTO
as well as the achievement of its establishment.1 3 To observers,
the establishment of the AB was a significant step in the devel-
opment of sophisticated international dispute settlement sys-
tems. States and commentators alike have seen the AB as a
model for other areas of international law.
At the same time, some NWTO Members-e specially the
United States-have voiced concerns about the AB regarding
both the substance of its decision-making and the procedures it
has applied. With respect to substantive issues, several Mem-
bers have expressed a concern that the AB has exceeded its man-
date. These governments have criticized the AB for overreaching
its authority by filling gaps, construing silences, selectively
choosing definitions, and creating obligations not agreed upon
8. Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO
Appellate Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE
WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 286,
294 (G. Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006). It was the "European Community" until
2009. See id.; see also Gregory Shaffer et al., The Extensive (but Fragile) Author-
ity of the WTO Appellate Body, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237 (2016) (explaining
the evolution of the AB and its distinction compared to the prior system).
9. Id. This concept of a limited appellate review is further reflected in the
small amount of guidance on the Appellate Body in the DSU, that the DSU in-
dicates that the AB should devise its own working procedures (procedural rules)
whereas the Members provided a number of baseline points for panels, and that
the members are intended to be only part-time. See also WTO Decision of 10
February 1995 referring to the need for the AB members to make "sporadic
trips" to Geneva.
10. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 17.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
11. Id. arts. 2.4, 17.2.
12. DSU, supra note 10, art. 17.2.
13. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (2004) (describ-
ing other commentators' observations about the success of the system and ex-
plaining, presciently, the expansiveness ofjudicial lawmaking at the WTO).
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among Members. For example, the United States commented as
early as February 2001 that the AB had "arrogated to [itself] the
right to censure particular Members for any reason" and that, in
another case, "the Appellate Body's findings ... verged on an in-
terpretation of a NWTO agreement, even though such interpreta-
tions could be made only by Members. . . . This was a new obli-
gation, not found in the NWTO Agreements."14 Earlier still,
Mexico remarked that: "The Appellate Body had added new ob-
ligations on Members. . . . The Appellate Body had contravened
the provisions of Article 19.2 of the [Dispute Settlement Under-
standing ("DSU")], because its findings had diminished and
added to the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."15 Pakistan has taken the position in relation to a
dispute in 1998: "[T]he Appellate Body had exceeded its author-
ity. The Appellate Body, by giving a new interpretation to certain
DSU provisions had overstepped the bounds of its authority by
undermining the balance of rights and obligations of Mem-
bers."16 Like comments have also been made over the years by
Malaysia, Chile, and Argentina, among others.1 7
Members also have expressed concern that the AB has com-
mented on topics not raised by the disputing parties, not essen-
tial to resolving the dispute, or not within the dispute's terms of
reference. It is on some of these bases that the United States
opposed reappointment of an AB member in May 2016 and again
in August 2018.18
14. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting Held in The Centre
William Rappard on 19 January 2001, WTO Doe. WT/DSB/M/97, ¶ 5 (Feb. 27,
2001); Dispute Settlement Body: Minutes of the Meeting Held in The Centre Wil-
liam Rappard on 16May 2001, WTO Doe. WT/DSB/M/105, ¶ 42 (June 19, 2001).
15. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting Held in The Centre
William Rappard on 25 November 1998, WTO Doe. WT/DSB/M/51, at 17-18,
(Jan. 22, 1999).
16. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting Held in The Centre
William Rappard on 6 November 1998, WTO Doe. WT/DSB/M/50, at 5 (Dec. 14,
1998).
17. See TERENCE P. STEWART, CAN THE WTO BE SAVED FROM ITSELF?
(2018).
18. Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Blocks Korean Judge from WTO Appellate Body,
BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2016), https://www.bna.com/us-blocks -korean
-n57982072872/. That the United States blocks reappointments and new ap-
pointments is, in a way, the least harmful move the United States could make.
Even if the result is that the Appellate Body stops work or slows to a crawl, the
United States remains a participant in the system and advocates reform. Even
if those calls for reform are disingenuous, the United States has not exited the
system. As discussed further below, where the system provides no other realistic
opportunities to be heard, taking steps to protect national interest and ensure
that the system works in your interest is a logical, even if problematic, position.
2018]
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The most salient of the procedural difficulties is that WTO
Members have been unable to agree on the process for the ap-
pointment of new AB members, and the number of members is
dwindling-to three as of September 30, 2018.19 An associated
procedural debate relates to AB members overstaying their
terms. Some AB members have continued to work on the appeals
previously assigned to them through the conclusion of the appeal
even after their term has expired.20 Because appeals are taking
much longer than the 60 to 90 days foreseen in the WTO agree-
ments, this practice has meant that some AB members have
stayed on for as long as one year after the official end date of
their terms.21 In some instances, the result has been that only
one of three AB members issuing a report in an appeal may have
a current appointment.22 To be sure, the possibility of staying on
to complete an appeal is set out in the AB Working Procedures,
a set of rules created by the AB in consultation with the Director-
General of the WTO and the Chairman of the DSB.23 Those pro-
cedures provide in Rule 15 that an AB member "may, with the
authorization of the AB and upon notification to the DSB [the
assembly of all the WTO Members], complete the disposition of
any appeal to which that person was assigned while a Mem-
ber . . . ."24 In other words, the option of staying on was created
by the AB itself.
Reconciling the competing views about the AR is essential
to resolving the current impasse. Debate over the successes and
19. Brett Fortnam, U.S.: WTO Appellate Body Has No Authority to Review
Panels' Factual Findings, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2018, 8:4GAM),
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/us-wto-appellate-body-has-no-authority
-review-panels-factual-findings. The AB has indicated in at least one dispute
that it will not be in a position to meet the deadlines required of it due to in-
creased workload for the remaining members. See Alex Lawson, Trump's WTO
Appeals Blockade Slowing Progress in Geneva, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://
www.1aw360.com/internationalarbitration/articles/107306 1/trump-s-wto
-appeals-blockade-slowing-progress-in-geneva.
20. U.S. MISSION GENEVA, Statements by the United States at the Meeting
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Nov. 22, 2017), https://geneva.usmission
.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Nov22.DSB_.pdf
21. WTO, Appellate Body Members, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-e/ab members descrp-e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (noting, in foot-
note 9, which AB members were extended for this purpose)
22. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Union Anti-dumping
Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia, WTO Doc.
WT/DS442/AB/R (Sept. 5, 2017).
23. See Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6,
Aug. 16, 2010.
24. Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6,
Rule 15, Aug. 16, 2010.
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failures of the WTO's hybrid court/arbitration model has
prompted fundamental questions: When an adjudicatory institu-
tion strays or is perceived to have strayed from its delegated in-
struction, what options are available to states? Institutional
change in an organization with 164 Members, including 36 that
were not present for the original design process in the early
1990s, poses a challenge rarely encountered in global legal his-
tory. The next Part of this Essay disaggregates the various ap-
praisals of the AB, walking through one central "crisis" of ideol-
ogy and three further crises that inform the present deadlock.
II. THE FOUR CRISES
The principal concern of critics examining the AB is that the
system has appropriated to itself powers that the WATO Members
never gave it. According to these voices, including the United
States, the AB has taken an overly liberal or activist approach
on substance, the scope of its own interpretation and authority,
and on certain procedural issues. Such an approach poses a prob-
lem for democratically elected governments that believe they
have not delegated those authorities. The EU,25 on the other
hand, has a different understanding of just what the system
ought to be or do. Whereas the United States advocates a con-
servative reading, the EU champions more judicial undertakings
by the AB.
The debate centers around the language of the WATO agree-
ment governing disputes, known as the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding26 ("DSU"), and what it states about the purpose and
role of the NWTO dispute settlement system.27 For example, the
DSU states that panels and the AB are not to "add to or dimin-
ish" the Members' rights and obligations as provided in the NWTO
agreements; panels and the AB are to "clarify" relevant provi-
sions of the agreements.28 The United States points to these
phrases to argue that the adjudicatory role is limited to applica-
25. Although the EU speaks with one voice at the WTO, one could further
parse the EU view to find competing positions among its members that can im-
pede the EU's engagement in some WTO activities. Indeed such competing po-
sitions can hinder the EU's ability to act or to propose substantial reform.
26. The agreement is commonly referred to as the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding ("DSU"). The actual agreement is titled the "Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes." See DSU, supra
note 10.
27. See id.
28. Id. art. 3.2.
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tions of the text, not elaborate interpretations, and that Mem-
bers control the substance and meaning.
On the other side, the EU and some other Members empha-
size provisions in the DSU that they say support an integrative
and law-making function for adjudicators. For example, the DSU
states that panels and the AB should maintain "security and pre-
dictability" and help the parties settle their disputes "in accord-
ance with customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law." 29
Further, the United States notes that Article 17.6 of the
DSU concerning the AB states that "[a]n appeal shall be limited
to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpreta-
tions developed by the panel," in contrast with Article 11 of the
DSU which refers to the function of panels and states that panels
should "make an objective assessment of the matter ... and
make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the cov-
ered agreements."30 In the view of the United States, whereas
panels review law and fact, the AB is only permitted to review
issues of law. The United States has catalogued instances in
which it claims the AB "consistently reviewed and even reversed
panel fact-finding . .. under different legal standards that it has
had to invent, and it has reached conclusions that are not based
on panel factual findings or undisputed facts."31 China and Can-
ada recently disputed the U.S. position at the DSB, arguing that
"most" Members believe the AB can review a panel's findings,
pointing to 10 disputes before the AB in which the United States
cited Article 11 as a basis for the AB's review.32
These competing readings of the DSU reflect a foundational
divergence. To the United States, the WATO agreements consti-
tute a contract to be interpreted strictly; to some other Members,
they form a constitution for independent institutions that em-
powers those institutions to elaborate and resolve ambiguities
29. Id.
30. DSU, supra note 10, art. 17.6, 11.
31. U.S. MISSION GENEVA, Statements by the United States at the Meeting
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, at 10 (Aug. 27, 2018), https://geneva
.usmission. gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Aug27.DSB_. Stint. as-delivered
.fin_.public.pdf.
32. Brett Fortnam, China Rebuts U.S. Claims that Appellate Body Cannot
Review Factual Findings, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://
insidetrade.com/daily-news/china-rebuts-us-claims-appellate-body-cannot
-review-factual-findings. Notably, at that meeting, the EU sided with the
United States, arguing that only panels are triers of fact.
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and lacunae in the constitutional foundation.33 Put differently,
where the agreements are silent or ambiguous, the United
States advocates deference to the Members, while others such as
the EU would support filling-in the gaps.34 The nature of the
U.S. complaint for 15 years across three presidential administra-
tions is that "the AB has not limited itself to ... precisely what's
in the agreement."35 On this view, the ways in which the AB has
exceeded the scope of its delegation include: the AB's issuance of
"advisory opinions," the inclusion of obiter dicta, the expansion
of rights and obligations beyond the text, the disregard of the 90-
day deadline for appeals, the continued service of AB members
after the expiration of their terms, the treatment of past reports
as precedential, and the AB's creation of a standard of review
over factual findings.
The dispute over the scope of the delegation and the WTO
AB's so-called activism comprises the first of the four crises iden-
tified here. This is the legal, ideological, or constitutional cri-
sis facing the WTO. The question as to whether the AB has ex-
ceeded its constitutional delegation is at the heart of what
divides the Members today.
33. U.S. Trade Policy Priorities: Robert Lighthizer, United States Trade
Representative, CTR. STRATEGIC & INTL STUDIES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://csis
-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170918_U.S._TradePolicy
PrioritiesRobertLighthizer-transcript.pdfkYkVT9pyKE.PK.utw uOQVoewn
Vi2j5L. Lighthizer argued that often where panels got it wrong was where they
did not view the GATT agreement as a contract and that it should be read that
way. Id. He acknowledged that Europeans and others see the system differently
as part of their broader acceptance of the international law enterprise. Id.
34. See Steinberg, supra note 13. Some observers have noted that the com-
plex nature of disputes that reach the AB may in effect force the AB's clarifying
ambiguities to effectively resolve the dispute. To the extent complex problems
implicating ambiguities arise, the U.S. position as characterized by some in the
Trump Administration appears to be that the AB should conclude that it cannot
reach a decision on the question presented.
35. U.S. Trade Policy Priorities, supra note 33.
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Scholars are likewise divided.36 While some have acknowl-
edged and assessed the problem over many years,37 others have
not viewed the AB's "vast jurisprudential acquiS"38 as a problem
or have even encouraged greater judicialization. Most commen-
tators and Members would not dispute that the AB developed its
authority through a series of critical moments39 ; what they
would dispute is whether the AB was intended to or ought to
serve as a system of authoritative judicial review. Debates in ac-
ademia over the reach of trade-adjudicator control are further
manifestations of the constitutional crisis. The other crises I
highlight below derive from this fundamental conflict of ideol-
ogy.
The second of the four crises is a political crisis, which is
shriller now than previously. This crisis complicates any resolu-
tion of the constitutional crisis. It is related to the divisions of
the legal debate, but it is not entirely enveloped by that conver-
sation. The perception of the Trump Administration is that, at
the WTO, the United States seems weak, even if it has won of-
ten.40 To this Administration, the wins are not the point: it is the
36. Scholars are also divided on other, related understandings of the pur-
pose of the WTO dispute settlement system. While all may agree that one pur-
pose is to encourage compliance, some see the ultimate end goal as accommo-
dating efficient breaches and providing compensation, whereas others see it as
enforcing rules. For some initial treatment of these issues generally, see Alan
Sykes, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance?, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 560 (M. Dauntonet al.
eds., 2012). The scholarly divide is also memorialized in an exchange between
Judith Bello and John Jackson debating the legality of a breach of the WTO
agreements. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INr'L L. 416 (1996); John H. Jackson, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal
Obligation, 91 AM. J. INTL L.60 (1997).
37. See Steinberg, supra note 13; see also Mitsuo Matsushita, The Dispute
Settlement Mechanism at the WTO: The Appellate Body Assessment and Prob-
lems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION § 23
(Martin Daunton et al. eds., 2012); Roger P. Alford, Reflections on U.S. Zero-
ing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM.
J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 196 (2006); John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An
Exercise in Trade Law Legislation, 6 J. INTL ECON. L. 113 (2003).
38. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Gov-
ernance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INTL L. 9, 10 (2016).
39. Rob McDougall outlines these moments effectively. ROBERT MCDOU-
GALL, CTR. FOR INTL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, CRISIS IN THE WTO: RESTOR-
ING THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION (2018), https://www.cigionline
org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper% O20no. 194.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Jennifer Epstein, Trump Says WTOIs Treating the U.S. 'Very
Badly'Despite Wins, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2018, 1:34 PM), https://www
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losses and the cases that have never been or could never be
brought because the system does not accommodate the problems
or the players of today. And, as per the constitutional crisis, it is
also the AB's perceived encroachment on Members' rights to reg-
ulate, especially in the area of trade remedies-safeguards, ze-
roing in the case of antidumping, and countervailing duties-de-
signed to provide the United States and others with corrective
measures for injured domestic industries. The U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer, made this point in an in-
terview last year saying that "a lot" of decisions coming out of
the trade remedies cases are "indefensible."41 Those cases are es-
pecially important for this Administration's trade law leadership
and for its positioning with constituents, such as large scale
manufacturers and their workers. In Ambassador Lighthizer's
opinion, the WTO's power extends too far without any backstop
for the United States. Hence, this is a political crisis.
To achieve its trade law goals, the United States today has
turned to domestic tools. The tools, the application of which
many U.S. trading partners deem inconsistent with the WTO
rules, enable major economic actions in short order. These
"three-digit" moves, so-called in reference to the three-digit stat-
utes under which the Trump Administration has taken action
(e.g., Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962)42 manifest the strong
U.S. views about the proper role of the WTO. The Trump Admin-
istration's actions reflect its apparent view that the WTO has
pushed the United States into a corner that continues to shrink,
preventing the government from taking vital steps to save major
industries. The three-digit maneuvers are, to their advocates,
ways to move beyond the inability of the WTO regime to effec-
tively regain a competitive edge for the United States. The lead-
ing economic governance philosophy is still centered on free
trade, but the political winds have changed to prompt the use of
domestic tools rather than the multilateral system, which some
believe has failed the United States.
A remaining piece of the political puzzle is the U.S. separa-
tion of powers and the potential role of the U.S. Congress. The
three-digit statutes are delegations of authority from Congress.
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 18-07-02/trump-says-wto-is-treating-the-u-s
-very-badly-despite-wins.
41. U.S. Trade Policy Priorities, supra note 33.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2251; 19 U.S.C. § 2411; 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
2018] 11
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Seeing the potential economic and legal consequences of the ex-
ecutive's recent moves, Congress is exploring ways to take those
authorities away.43
As noted above, long before the Trump Administration, the
United States had raised concern with substantive and proce-
dural issues in the WATO dispute settlement system. Taking
those into consideration, one might view the problem not as U.S.
recalcitrance but rather as a lack of action on the part of other
NATO Members to address those percolating issues. Despite the
signs of trouble for the last two decades, few attempts at change
have been made.44 This is the third of the four crises: the re-
sponsiveness crisis. The responsiveness crisis manifests in at
least three ways: failure of the membership to act-exacerbating
the ideological and political divisions; failure of the adjudicators
or their staff to be attuned to the growing discontent; and failure
of the negotiating rounds to lead to meaningful reform.
First, the U.S. Congress and three U.S. administrations
made clear their distress over many years and not just in cases
where the United States lost or where the United States was a
party. More important, at least 18 other Members have made
comments on the record to the same effect.45 Although many
Members, including the United States, criticize the NWTO dispute
settlement system when they face a losing result, the range and
frequency of these institution-specific omments go beyond dis-
appointment with legal outcomes. Their focus on the AB's over-
reach suggest that at least some Members subscribe to or sym-
pathize with the U.S. position. Notwithstanding these views, no
reforms have been made.46
43. Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders its Role,
LAWFARE (Aug. 5, 2018, 11:00AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-war
-battles-congress-reconsiders-its-role.
44. Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramirez-Hernin-
dez, WTO (May 28, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
ricardoramirezfarwellspeech-e.htm.
45. See STEWART, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. Not until early fall 2018 did Canada and the EU announce significant
reform proposals. On September 18, the EU proposed wide-ranging reforms that
would tackle rulemaking, transparency, and dispute settlement. The proposal
walks through almost point-by-point the U.S. demands. See Brett Fortnam, EU,
in WTOReform Proposal, Targets AppellateBody, Forced Tech Transfer, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Sept. 19, 2018). Around the same time, Canada announced it would
propose a reform package in October 2018 that would "1) improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the monitoring function; 2) safeguard and strengthen the
dispute settlement system; and 3) lay the foundation for modernizing the sub-
stantive trade rules when the time is right." See Isabelle Hoagland, Eyeing Oc-
tober Summit in Ottawa, Canada Prepares WTO Reform Pitch, INSIDE U.S.
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Second, the responsiveness crisis also extends to the AB it-
self. Early on, the AB recognized the delicate balance struck by
the language of these provisions.4 7 But this recognition was lost
with time. Rather than seeking to adapt, the AB carried forward
and in some instances doubled down. As one commentator de-
scribes it, the expansive mandate the AB has taken on was nei-
ther required nor inevitable but rather the outcome of choices
made by various adjudicators and their legal support.4 8
The final piece of the responsiveness crisis has little to do
with the dispute settlement system at all: it is the larger NWTO
purpose and activities, specifically the WTO's negotiating func-
tion. In December 2017 at the NWTO Ministerial Conference, the
USTR made clear that concerns about the dispute settlement
system had intensified due to the unsuccessful negotiating
rounds over two decades. In those rounds, Members were unable
to reach agreement on changes to the functions or substance of
the regime, and likewise to be responsive to prior U.S. concerns.
The absence of change in negotiation has given the dispute set-
tlement system an outsized influence. According to Ambassador
Lighthizer, the NATO has become "a litigation-centered organiza-
tion."49 The AB's activist and expansive approach has encour-
aged Members to seek through dispute settlement that which
TRADE (Sept. 25, 2018), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/eyeing-october
-summit-ottawa-canada-prepares-wto-reform-pitch. Other members are ru-
mored to be hosting reform-focused gatherings in November 2018 as they per-
ceive the system to have reached a state of crisis. To be sure, the most recent
U.S. position-that the AB ought to act in accordance with the U.S. interpreta-
tion of the DSU provisions and that trading partners should simultaneously be
proposing reforms for the United States to receive and consider-is both incon-
sistent and overly convenient, allowing the United States to do nothing but con-
tinue to bemoan the lack of responsiveness even if those responses would appear
not to appease it. See The WTO: Looking Forward, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.csis.org/events/wto
-looking-forward.
47. Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, at 19, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R
(Apr. 25, 1997) ("Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates
the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage
either panels or the Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provi-
sions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dis-
pute.").
48. Robert McDougall, Options for Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement
Function, - J. WORLD TRADE - (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the author).
49. Lighthizer: WTO Becoming Too Focused on Litigation, Must Concen-
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they would have sought through negotiations. In other words,
the WTO's legislative function has broken down; there is no feed-
back loop to keep dispute settlement decisions in check. That
lack of responsiveness further drives the U.S. animus toward the
AB.
The Members that missed the warning signs and the U.S.
calls for change-even if those calls were premised on earlier
miscalculations by the United States about how the system
would serve its interests-may have themselves misconceived
the balance necessary to sustain the fragility of the system. Re-
negotiating the terms of the system or negotiating an authorita-
tive interpretation of certain fundamental provisions is today
not just costly or unreliable, it is seemingly impossible.
The responsiveness crisis is related to the fourth and final
crisis: the structural crisis. By that, I refer to a phenomenon
that Richard Steinberg has highlighted: WTO Members' inter-
ests have diverged at the same time global economic power has
become more dispersed.5 0 As can be seen in the behavior of gov-
ernments in many international settings, the mood on interna-
tional institutions and multilateral rulemaking has changed.5 1
This climate means governments are more skeptical of certain
types of binding and compulsory international dispute settle-
ment compared to the 1990s when those designs had not yet been
tried.
The structural crisis is most clearly visible when looking at
the new place of China. The rise of China was one of at least
three unanticipated elements at the time of the WTO's creation.
But it is not just China's rise that contributes to the crises: it is
its state-owned enterprise architecture and the way through
which it carries out its trade policy by skirting the multilateral
rules. Some in the Trump Administration appear to believe that
any multilateral dispute settlement system is destined to fail
when it comes to China because China will always seek to cir-
cumvent the rules.
Here again, the constitutional crisis informs divergent
views: advocates see (and the Obama Administration saw) the
WTO system as capable of managing the China issue by way of
50. Richard H. Steinberg, The Impending Crisis of the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 112TH ANNUAL MEETING (forthcoming 2019).
51. Joost Pauwelyn and Rebecca Hamilton have chronicled many instances
of state "exit" from international courts and tribunals - a trend that others have
called a "backlash." See Joost Pauwelyn & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Exit from In-
ternational Tribunals, 2018 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1.
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an expansive interpretation of the rules whereas critics see Chi-
nese behavior as falling beyond that which the agreements an-
ticipated. At least one commentator has taken the position that
either the system must change to accommodate the Chinese in-
ternal structure and methods or China must be forced to leave
the WTO.52 Exacerbating matters, as noted above, efforts by the
United States as well as U.S. manufacturers and producers to
use trade remedies tools as a sort of escape valve to combat prob-
lematic Chinese exports have been circumscribed by some of the
most expansive AB decisions. Any demands the United States
may make toward China to open its economy are complicated by
a mismatch with how much the United States could or would do
in return.
The role of China in pushing the constitutional and other
crises to a tipping point should not be understated. In some re-
spects, the approach the USTR has taken to combat China and
to deepen competition is to act more like China.53 It appears that
the Administration both fears China and seeks to replicate some
of its state-centric ways. But this is not the 1980s world and
China is very different from Japan-the actor against whom like
tools were used then.5 4 It remains to be seen how much the mul-
tilateral system can stretch for both the United States and
China.
A second unanticipated element was the abundance of ap-
peals and the number of cases brought against the United
States. Up to 2014, 68 percent of all panel reports were ap-
pealed.55 159 of the 561 disputes filed by August 1, 2018 were
filed against the United States. The United States has brought
130 disputes against others, which means 37 percent of the cases
not brought by the United States have been brought against it.56
52. Testimony of Jennifer Hillman Before the U.S. -China Economic and Re-
view Security Commission: Hearing on U.S. Tools to Address Chinese Market
Distortions (2018). For a fuller analysis of China's rise see Gregory Shaffer &
Henry Gao, China's Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 115 (2018). See also Mark Wu, The "China, Inc." Challenge to Global Trade
Governance, 57 HARV. J. INT'L L. 261 (2016).
53. Quinn Slobodian, You Live in Robert Lighthizer's World Now, FOREIGN
POLICY, (Aug. 6, 2018, 5:46PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/06/you-live
-in-robert-lighthizers -world-now-trump -trade/.
54. Bob Davis, In Trade Fight, China Today Differs From 1980s Japan,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2018 12:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-trade-fight
-china-today-differs-from- 1980s-japan- 1523202722.
55. Dispute Settlement: Statistics, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispue/stats-e.htm (last visited Sep. 21, 2018).
56. Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Member, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
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In its August 27, 2018 statement to the DSB, the United States
argued that appeals are taking far too long due to the extensive
factual review that the AB carries out in many instances, despite
that the DSU does not permit such a review. It may also be that
more Members appeal losing panel reports on the basis that the
AB is likely to review the factual predicate for the panel's deci-
Sion.
A third unforeseen element was the proliferation of free
trade agreements (FTAs). The politics on FTAs run hot and cold,
but they have not helped to demonstrate the strength of a rules-
based enforcement system for the United States. In the case of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), flaws in
the dispute settlement design mechanism have led the parties to
use the WATO dispute settlement system instead. Further, six
months after the start of the Trump Administration, the United
States lost its first FTA case since the last NAFTA case in 2001.57
Even prior to learning this outcome, this Administration ap-
peared skeptical of dispute settlement processes in FTAs, seeing
them as unacceptable usurpations of authority in which outsid-
ers dictate U.S. policy. The structural crisis is made manifest not
just in global power shifts but also in revised views on the utility
of international institutions uch as plurilateral FTAs and of dis-
pute settlement mechanisms.
Each of these crises contributes to the current impasse at
the NATO and each has a ripple effect that extends far beyond. In
economic terms, the ripple extends to farmers, consumers, and
workers around the globe as states escalate their punitive tariffs
on foreign products. In legal terms, the interactions at the NATO
may have lessons for other international bodies.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
An examination of this "other" trade war is vitally important
not only for trade law but also to the extent it might portend a
new direction in international dispute settlement more gener-
ally. The NWTO impasse has repercussions for debates over how
to conceive of state delegations to adjudicatory bodies, especially
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu bycountry-e.htm, (last visited Sep. 21, 2018).
57. In the Matter of Guatemala Issues Relating to the Obligations Under
Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr
.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala
-submission-under-cafta-dr, (last visited Sep. 21, 2018) (providing access to all
relevant case materials).
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given that the WTO system is regularly touted as a "model." This
work thus confronts issues of dispute management design and
the sustainability of third party mechanisms in international
economic law.
Many of the quasi-judicial mechanisms conceived in the last
century are facilitative management systems, not strict compli-
ance regimes.5 8 Most have limited powers to develop enforceable
judgments. They face the challenge of developing solutions based
on law that will practically resolve the often politicized question
before them. For example, under the GATT dispute settlement
system, panels that wanted their decisions to be palatable to los-
ing parties might have taken that into consideration to avoid the
prospect of not being adopted. At that time, the "adoption" (the
formal acceptance) of a panel's report required a positive consen-
sus of all the GATT contracting parties, allowing respondents to
block losing outcomes against themselves.59 The normalization
of the WTO dispute settlement system may have given a false
sense of insulation from this prior feeling of institutional insecu-
rity in recent years, especially where powerful states are in-
volved.
Other state-to-state arbitral bodies face the same consider-
ations. In sensitive cases involving control of natural resources
or boundary delimitation issues that have occupied national
agendas for decades if not centuries, adjudicators confront a
nearly insurmountable task. In these contexts, the adjudicator
is not merely adjudging the merits of the dispute but also is im-
plicitly called upon to contextualize the case in his or her appli-
cation of the law. Some institutional designs incentivize sensi-
tivity to power politics. At least one commentator has proposed
that the AB do just that. In what Steinberg calls dejudicializa-
tion,6 0 akin to what contract scholars might deem relational con-
tract theory, the AB members would bear in mind these sensi-
tivities underlying the constitutional crisis and view disputes
through that lens.
International legal systems that create quasi-judicial roles
without providing clear guidance on what that role entails, what
58. Karen Alter has broken down courts in multiple ways, including in their
adjudicatory functions. See generally KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014).
59. Mary Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making,
17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 653 (1997).
60. See Steinberg, supra note 50.
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is the place of precedent, and whether consistency among inter-
pretations matters, among other fundamental questions, risk
precisely these types of conflicts of norms and of legal ideologies.
When other international courts and tribunals have experienced
similar crises of legitimacy after asserting their judicial inde-
pendence and seeking to expand their authority,61 parties to
those courts have responded. For instance, when the European
Court of Justice expanded its power into the political and social
sphere, the parties to the Court sought to use the Maastricht
Treaty to limit the court to enforcing only economic treaty provi-
sions of the union.62
A public law model suggests the need for rules and institu-
tions in international dispute management, but the form of the
institutions remains a significant question for policymakers
even after many years of experimentation. Once the institutions
are created, what can states do in the face of what they consider
to be institutional self-aggrandizement?63 Because some states
view the institution to which they delegate as an independent
trustee and others see the institution as a beholden agent, it is
challenging for dispute settlement bodies to sort the task before
them. The WTO AB especially must confront these issues. While
states have not resolved their issues, the AB bears the brunt of
the conflict. The AB receives the criticism, but the problem lies
a stage earlier: with the divergent views on delegation among
states.
As seen in the WTO AB impasse, the clash between positiv-
ist and integrationist perspectives, and a changing equilibrium
among those schools of thought in domestic politics, is forcing a
renewed discussion regarding the legitimacy of institutionaliz-
ing international economic law dispute management. This clash
implicates a consensus that has enjoyed more than twenty years
of growth in authority. On the horizon are new FTAs, changes to
model bilateral investment treaties, and challenges to existing
courts and tribunals. The trade experience emphasizes that the
scope, nature, form, and function of states' delegations matter.
61. Pauwelyn & Hamilton, supra note 51.
62. See Karen Alter, Who are the 'Masters of the Treaty"?: European Gov-
ernments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT. ORG. 121 (1998).
63. The WTO is not unique in facing that criticism. Other courts have been
said to extend their jurisdiction, such as the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea and the International Court of Justice.
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CONCLUSION
Despite some limited proposals on the table,64 some govern-
ments may choose to wait until the next U.S. presidential elec-
tion before trying to reconcile views and end this other trade war,
but there is little indication that the U.S. position will shift sig-
nificantly with new leadership. Still, despite the gridlock, the
United States continues to participate in the NATO, including in
dispute settlement. U.S. officials regularly refer to the mainte-
nance of a strong rule-of-law system for global trade. In fact, the
United States has proposed reforms to other parts of the WATO
system as recently as early 2018. The USTR said in late Septem-
ber 2018 that the NATO is "an important body and ..... if we
didn't have it we'd have to invent it."65 In 2017, speaking of the
dispute settlement system, he said, "We have to figure out a way
to . . . have it work." 66
The tension between diplomatic and legal mechanisms for
transnational enforcement is not new, nor is it isolated to the
international trade law regime. The evolution of the "crisis" has
important implications for other international institutions. As
more cases are filed against the United States in international
courts and tribunals, and as more international agreements eek
to set up dispute settlement mechanisms, an examination of the
delegation and design issues at the NATO takes on greater mean-
ing. What is clear amid all the noise is that whatever the change
to move international trade dispute settlement system forward,
it cannot and will not be small.
64. See Farewell Speech, supra note 44; see also supra note 46 (discussing
the Canadian and EU reform proposals under discussion).
65. Hoagland, supra note 46.
66. U.S. Trade Policy Priorities, supra note 33.
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